In The AvMA Medical and Legal Journal in our last issue, Mr Julian Matthews considered the complicated decision of the House of Lords in Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41. Just three months later, in Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2, the House of Lords returned to the issue of causation of injury in clinical negligence cases. In this issue we include a case report and an article by Mr Simon Cridland about their decision.
Causation is a complex area of case law. In clinical negligence claims (as in negligence cases generally) a claimant must prove not only that his or her care was negligent, but also that, on the balance of probabilities, the negligence caused the injury and loss for which he or she claims compensation. Lawyers often regard causation as a more difficult hurdle to overcome than proving negligent care, particularly in cases of failure to diagnose illness that may reduce the chance of a successful outcome. Patients have difficulty in understanding how a health professional can 'get away with' proven negligence because of 'a technicality' that is a successful causation defence.
"Would their lordships confirm in Gregg that the departure was a modest one, limited to the type of facts found in Chester, or would they further extend their departure?"
Julian Matthews rightly asked if Chester raised more questions than answers. The House of Lords themselves indicated that their judgment was a departure from the traditional law of causation. They appeared to take the view that doctors should be held to strict account through the law of negligence if they negligently fail to respect a patient's autonomy by omitting to obtain valid consent to treatment. Would their lordships confirm in Gregg that the departure was a modest one, limited to the type of facts found in Chester, or would they further extend their departure?
By a majority of three to two, the judgment of the House of Lords was that there should be no further change to the law of causation. Simon Cridland (on pages 138-141) explains the reasoning behind each of the five opinions of their lordships. The majority held that the test should remain the balance of probabilities, as their lordships had set out in Hotson v East Berkshire Heath Authority [1987] AC 750. So it remains (leaving aside Chester) that unless there is a probability exceeding 50% that negligent care caused personal injury, a claimant will receive no compensation, no matter how grievous the negligence or injury.
In the view of the minority, the loss of a 45% prospect of recovery is just as much a real loss for a patient as the loss of a 55% prospect of recovery. They considered that it would be irrational and indefensible for the law to deprive such a patient of a remedy. In language echoing that of the majority of their lordships in Chester, 'The doctor's duty would be hollow. The duty would be empty of content' (per Lord Nicholls).
"There is little, if any, fall out from
Gregg. The limited fall-out from Chester will no doubt be tidied up or marginalized at some future point."
The majority considered that any change to the law of causation should be left to Parliament, in part because of the 'enormous consequences for insurance companies and the National Health Service' (per Lord Hoffman). For those who side with the dissenting minority, there may be two opportunities to influence change through the Government's forthcoming legislative programme. One is the proposed Compensation Bill and the other the proposed NHS Redress Bill. Without legislative change, the law of causation generally seems settled for the foreseeable future. There is little, if any, fall out from Gregg, and the limited fall-out from Chester will no doubt be tidied up or marginalized at some future point.
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